

Chapter 3: Intelligence Community to 1963; Vietnam

Like the FBI, [the CIA] was a runaway agency, in this case endowed with men professionally trained in deception, a wide choice of weapons, reckless purposes, a global charter, maximum funds and minimum accountability.¹

13.0 Introduction: Why study the intelligence community?

There are several reasons for looking into the intelligence community bearing in mind our interest in the Kennedy assassination. The first emerged in the preceding chapter: we need to determine if there are any serious grounds for believing Oswald to have been directly involved in intelligence activities during his brief life: during his years in the Marines, during his stay in the Soviet Union, or after his return to the United States.

The second reason to familiarize ourselves with the intelligence community is to help us understand and evaluate a number of claims that have emerged over the years from individuals who have had a connection with intelligence and who have suggested that there was a link between the CIA and the Kennedy assassination, independent of any connection to Oswald. Among these are: (i) Richard Case Nagell; (ii) Marita Lorenz; (iii)

The third reason for studying the CIA is to better understand the complexities folded around the series of defectors from the KGB in the late 1950s and early 1960s -- Goleniewski, Golitsin, and Nosenko -- and to see if an understanding of these defectors (and the moles that they did and did not help to uncover) sheds any light on the Kennedy assassination.

Perhaps the most important reason to study the CIA derives from our need to understand a powerful governmental agency which arguably had motive, means, and opportunity to commit the Kennedy assassination or other assassinations, either as a project undertaken by the upper level executive, or as a project embarked upon by elements lower down, themselves perhaps acting in conjunction with gray forces outside of the Agency, such as organized crime.

In addition to asking why we should be interested in the CIA in our study of the Kennedy assassination, we may well wish to look into the interest that the CIA has displayed as well in that particular crime. As we will see, at the time that the Warren Commission was established in 1963, it assigned the function of liaison with the Commission to Counterintelligence, headed then by James Jesus Angleton, and the Agency's policy was to submit to the Commission only the answers to the questions directly asked, not venturing beyond to provide relevant information even when the Commission was not informed well enough to ask the questions that it would have had to. Later, when District Attorney Garrison in New Orleans brought charges against Clay Shaw, we will learn, DCI Richard Helms maintained an ongoing concern for what Garrison was doing.² And the CIA showed considerable interest in Lee Oswald in early October, when it prepared documents pointing to Oswald's alleged visits to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City.

¹ Arthur Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, p. 493.

² According to Helms's assistant, Victor Marchetti. [source:]

2The spirit of the new CIA

Lt. General James Doolittle reported to President Eisenhower that a new conception of intelligence and covert operations was necessary in the post-Korean world:

Because the United States is relatively new at the game, and because we are opposed by a police state enemy whose social discipline and security measures have been built up and maintained at a high level for many years, the usable information we are obtaining is still far short of our needs.

As long as it remains national policy, another important requirements is an aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary organization more effective, more unique and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be allowed to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient and secure establishment of this mission....

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.

3 3.1 OSS

43.2 early CIA

In 1951, while Walter Bedell Smith was still DCI, Frank Wisner became Deputy Director for Plans, and Helms became Deputy Director for Plans.

One of the most significant operations that the CIA was involved in during this period was MK/Ultra, a large-scale project of research, experimentation, and development concerned with the use of sophisticated techniques for controlling human behavior and thought. MK/Ultra began in a period in which the academic sciences were heavily weighted toward a behavioristic view of the human mind; in psychology proper, this was the heyday of B.F. Skinner's operational view of behaviorism, itself derived from the early behaviorist xx, who himself had turned from academia to public relations, in fact.

Elements within the CIA were struck by what seemed to them to be great success stories in the Communist countries, where public trials could be run, and defendants seemed to be willing to speak against themselves, and say the things that it might be expected that the state would want them to say. How was this done? The CIA suspected drugs played at least a role in the answer, and MK/Ultra was the result. MK/Ultra, with Dr. Sydney Gottlieb as its head (he was eventually Direct of the Technical Services Staff of the CIA), was involved in a number of projects, including the experimental use of LSD, in efforts to find either a truth serum, or a serum which would put the subject into a state so that his behavior could then be controlled in one fashion or another. Related to this was the effort to implant electronic devices in the brains of both humans and animals in order to control their behavior. This was MK/Ultra Subproject 94, operational

later in the decade: "The purpose of this subproject is to provide for a continuation of investigations on the remote directional control of activities in selected species of animals. Miniaturized stimulating electrode implants in specific brain center areas will be utilized."³

Drugs were used to overcome subjects' ability to dissemble as early as World War II. Cigarettes laced with the active chemical in marijuana were used on at least one member of Lucky Luciano's mob, August Del Gracio, to ensure that he was telling the truth. More sophisticated -- or at least more ambitious, and quite evidently far more dangerous -- efforts were made in the early 1950s, to the point where the death of a subject was considered a reasonable endpoint of the operation.⁴ The death of at least one American subject, who was given LSD without his prior knowledge or approval, Frank Olson, created a minor stir at the time of his suicide in 1953; Sydney Gottlieb was given a minor reprimand, but it apparently had little or no effect either on his activities nor on the importance given to them by the Agency. LSD remained a focus of Agency interest throughout the 1950s, and incredible as it may seem today, the Agency responded to the fear of an "LSD gap": it was believed by some that the Soviet Union was engaged in a massive effort to corner the global market on LSD, and thus for reasons of national security the Agency needed to be able to ensure a consistent flow of LSD to its projects.⁵

Gottlieb continued to develop techniques for Agency projects utilizing modern technology. His later work involving developing deadly toxins to kill people became known later on, and we will see his involvement in the CIA efforts to assassinate Castro using these poisons.

53.3 early activities:

51.1.1. Iran 1953

Iran has been a major producer of petroleum since the beginning of an international oil market. With some assistance and persuasion from the redoubtable Anglo-Russian spy Sydney Reilly,⁶ the British established a long-term contractual relationship with Iran, through the offices of an Australian speculator, William D'Arcy. The British owned 56%; 22% was owned by Burmah Oil (a British-Shell affiliate).⁷

Mohammed Mossadegh was elected prime minister of Iran in 1951, and continued a series of negotiations with Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. for a larger part of the oil profits. Coming to loggerheads with Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, he nationalized Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. on May 1,

³ CIA, Memorandum for the Record, Project MKUltra, Subproject 94, October 18, 1960, cited in Ranelagh, 207.

⁴ Ranelagh, p. 207.

⁵ Ranelagh, p. 211. Many of the research projects were conducted outside of the Agency itself, in work that was funded through the Jospiah Macy, Jr., Foundation and the Gechickter Fund for Medical Research. This included work on LSD at Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, Mount Sinai Hospital, Boston Psychopathic Hospital, the Addiction Research Center in Lexington, Ky., the University of Rochester (which has a long and well-known history of close collaboration with the CIA), the University of Oklahoma, and the University of Illinois Medical School. (loc. cit.).

⁶ Robin Bruce Lockhart, *Reilly: Ace of Spies*, p. 48

⁷ John M. Blair, *The Control of Oil*, p. 43

1951. Mossadeq had been trying to arrange for Iran a financial arrangement of the sort that Saudi Arabia was getting from Aramco (Aramco was Standard of California and the Texas Co.⁸), one which would allow as much as 50% of the oil profits to go to the country. But Anglo-Iranian would have none of it, and they declared a boycott which made it impossible for Iran to sell any of its oil. This led to economic problems within the country (oil revenues dropped from \$400 million/year to less than \$1 million/year⁹), and conditions ripe for fomenting a coup, as Kermit Roosevelt of the CIA succeeded in doing. The coup removed Mossadeq from power, and brought Pahlavi back into power as the Shah.

When the Parliament refused to grant Mossadeq's demand that it extend for one year his right to govern by decree, a wave of demonstrations swept the country. Mossadeq directly challenged the Shah, ordered a plebiscite to dissolve Parliament and won more than 99 percent of the votes cast and counted. In a swiftly moving series of events, the Shah attempted to oust Mossadeq by decree, failed, and fled the country as Mossadeq's supporters demonstrated in the streets smashing the statues of the Shah and his father. The military moved in, and in bloody street fighting deposed Mossadeq and restored the Shah to his throne, a move which was assisted clandestinely by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.¹⁰

A new distribution of participation in Iranian oil was the word of the day, and American oil companies became the major participants. The final arrangement was 40% for British petroleum, 35% divided evenly among Exxon, Mobil, SoCal, Texaco, and Gulf Oil (all American companies), 6% for Compagnie Française Pétrole, and 5% for a group of small American "independents", which included Getty, Arco, Sohio, Charter, and Conoco.¹¹

52.2.2. Guatemala 1954

Guatemala was a major center for the banana business, and Jorge Ubico, who controlled Guatemala in the 1930s and 1940s, gave United Fruit Company main solid control over enormous stretches of banana plantation, as well as railroad lines and both Pacific and Caribbean ports.

The CIA was the central organizer of the coup in Guatemala mounted in 1954 against Jacobo Arbenz. Arbenz was elected president in Guatemala with 65% of the vote in November, 1950. Already in 1952, the CIA had organized a large scale operation to overthrow Arbenz, named Operation Fortune. Bedell Smith, Deputy DCI, placed Col. J.C. King (chief of the Operations Directorate for Latin America) in charge, and King developed a plan that utilized both General Somoza's support in Nicaragua, and United Fruit Company's large shipping fleet. The operation was scotched -- put on hold, as it turned out -- due to protests from the State Department, originating with Deputy Secretary David Bruce and Secretary Dean Acheson.

⁸ John M. Blair, *The Control of Oil*, p. 37; Venezuela had the same financial arrangement (op. cit., 78)

⁹ Blair, p. 79

¹⁰ U.S. Gov't., *Report on Multinational Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. 1974. p. 64, cited in Blair, p. 80.

¹¹ John M. Blair, *The Control of Oil*, p. 46

In 1953, Arbenz nationalized a large part of United Fruit's land holdings, and United Fruit brought their protests to the ear of John Foster Dulles, the new Secretary of State under Eisenhower. The assignment was given back to the CIA. Kim Roosevelt was offered the chance to organize the effort; he turned it down, and Colonel King was placed in charge. King brought in a small army of mercenaries, who were ignominiously arrested; King was removed, and Frank Wisner was placed in charge, with Tracy Barnes his aide. Wisner renamed it Operation Success, and brought in Col. Albert Haney, chief of station in Korea. David Atlee Phillips was in charge of propaganda.

John Peurifoy was appointed ambassador to Guatemala by Eisenhower in October of 1953; he had been an administrative assistant to Dean Acheson, and then ambassador to Greece prior to this posting. The steps toward the coup included the removal of foreign aid, the blockage of loans from the Export-Import Bank and the World Bank, and interference with shipping coming into port in Guatemala.¹²

Arbenz asked for assistance from the Soviet Union, and the United States caught wind of the impending shipment, due to arrive on May 17, 1954. Soviet arms in Guatemala was sufficient provocation for the U.S. to intervene directly. On June 27, Arbenz fled to Mexico, and Castillo Armas took control.

David Atlee Phillips was the man in charge of the "Voice of Liberation" radio station -- in charge of psychological warfare and propaganda.

Castillo Armas passed legislation to ensure guarantees to overseas investors -- such as the banana companies -- for their investments. Eisenhower found it to be an excellent venture.

6 Excursus: United Fruit Company

United Fruit was well connected. Their law firm was Sullivan & Cromwell, the Dulles brothers' firm, and both brothers held stock in United Fruit.

- The covert operations planned in Guatemala were approved by the National Security Council, whose director, **General Robert Cutler**, served on the board of directors of United Fruit (he was chairman of the board?); he was also board chairman of Old Colony Trust, the transfer bank used by United Fruit.
 - **John M. Cabot**, Asst Sec of State for Inter-American Affairs, was a major stockholder.
 - **Sinclair Weeks**, Sec. of Commerce, "had been the director of United Fruit's registrar bank."
 - **John McCloy**, president of the World Bank, had been on the United Fruit board.
 - **Robert Hill**, U.S. ambassador to Costa Rica, had been on the board of United Fruit.
- (Source: Thompson, *The Missiles of October*, p.

7 Other topics

One of the better-known cases where the CIA's efforts did not succeed was in their efforts to unseat Sukarno as the leader of Indonesia. [dates]

¹² Robert Smith Thompson, *The Missiles of October*, 61.

71.1. Assassination efforts

In the fall of 1960, the CIA embarked on a project to improve its covert assassination capabilities. Whether Eisenhower intended it or not, the Agency understood it to be its mission to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, the prime minister of the Congo (now Zaire), and Fidel Castro would soon be the primary target of this enterprise. The CIA engaged two assassins, one code-named QJ/Win, a European, and the other, WI/Rogue. We will discuss WI/Rogue at some length in Chapter XX below, in connection with Christian David, believed by some experts to be WI/Rogue.¹³

72.2. Berlin tunnel

One of the CIA's largest projects in the 1950s was the creation of a tunnel in Berlin stretching under the line separating East and West Berlin, allowing CIA technicians to tap Soviet lines used for intelligence purposes. It was in operation from late 1955 until April 22, 1956, when the Soviets announced its discovery. Later analysis, however, revealed that George Blake, a Soviet spy in British intelligence, leaked word of the creation of the tunnel to the Soviets, so that the Soviets knew of its existence from the start.

The project was overseen by William King Harvey, a CIA officer and former FBI agent during WWII. The tunnel ran 1476 feet, with a 78 inch diameter (that's 6 feet); it was 20 feet below the ground. To orient themselves, two CIA agents in army uniform went into East Berlin, and had a flat tire at the right spot so that they could install a small radio reflector.¹⁴

50 officers in Washington poured over the Russian and German messages received.

Eleven months and eleven days after the intercepts had begun, the tunnel was "discovered"-- on April 21, 1956.

In general, the CIA viewed the project -- even with its discovery -- as a moral victory and a propaganda victory.

(among those involved: Richard Helms (see Russell 1992:459), Ted Shackley)

8 Profile: Desmond Fitzgerald

Junior fellow at Harvard (along with Arthur Schlesinger and McGeorge Bundy). Joined the Office of Current Intelligence. Worked for Gen. Joseph Stilwell in the Army G-2 staff during WW 2, working with the Nationalist Chinese 6th Army. He rose to the rank of major.

In 1951, he joined the CIA, where he started as executive officer to Col. Richard Stilwell, son of Joseph Stilwell. He organized operations coming out of Taiwan, first as deputy head, then as head of Far East Division based in Taiwan (he worked there with Ray Cline, COS in Taiwan). Later [?] he was COS in the Philippines.

¹³ According to Dick Russell, (*Knew Too Much*, p. 785), "Jim Marrs of the Forth Worth StarTelegram was told by exArmy intelligence officer William Spector that WI/ROGUE's real name was Christian Jacques David."

¹⁴ Renelagh, *the Agency*, p. 292.

1958: In the wake of the failed coup attempt in Indonesia against Sukarno backed by the CIA, FitzGerald became head of the Directorate for Plans section on the Far East, where he was responsible for the early buildup of the war in Viet Nam.

In 1962, after the Cuban Missile crisis, when William Harvey sent in Cuban militants during the crisis itself, naturally leading to a furious Kennedy, FitzGerald was brought from Far East to the head of the Cuba activities -- apparently *all* of the CIA's Latin American affairs. In 1965, he became deputy director of Plans.

On July 23, 1967, after playing a game of tennis, he had a heart attack and died.

Source: See Ranelagh, *The Agency*, p.223.

93.4 the KGB moles in the us and in great britain

A theme of great interest to observers of Western and Eastern intelligence services has been the transmigration of defectors from the intelligence services of each side to the arms of the other side, and the revelations of "moles" -- secret agents -- implanted deep in the intelligence agencies of the enemy's side. The suspicion of a traitor in one's own organization, proven or not, has been a corrosive force in the history of our own intelligence services.

The first moles were ferreted out (so to speak) in 1950: these were Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, two British subjects working in Washington, D.C. for their government. Angleton had come back to Washington after World War II, having been trained in London by Kim Philby, to whom he had become close. Angleton came back and worked with Bill Harvey's Staff C, tracking down Soviet spies in the US. They both worked closely with Philby, who was the MI6 liaison in Washington.

Now, some information about Soviet infiltration into British intelligence had come out as early as the 1930s, including information that came from the Russian General Krivitsky, who had defected because of the Stalin purges; Krivitsky spoke of a British journalist who covered the Spanish civil war, who was undoubtedly Philby. But it would not become clear till years later that Philby was working for the KGB, the Soviet equivalent of the CIA.

Increasing successes in the post-war period led American intelligence closer to fingering Maclean as a Soviet asset, and Maclean fled on May 21, 1951, along with Guy Burgess, reappearing at a press conference in Moscow. Why Burgess went with him is not clear in retrospect, but his disappearance immediately put Philby under suspicion as well. The British, and William King Harvey, immediately suspected Philby -- though not Angleton (Ranelagh, however, kind--most likely too kind-- to Angleton, claims that Angleton more or less caught on to Philby's situation).

At the time, it was argued that Communist knowledge of American plans with respect to Korea led to a greatly weakened position at the time of the outbreak of war in Korea (June 1950).

Philby was finally acknowledge by the British to have been a mole on July 1, 1963. In the twelve years since Maclean and Burgess had flown the coop to Moscow, Philby was under increasing suspicion, but he was not formally charged by Her Majesty's government.

103.5 Angleton and his mole theory:

But other defectors (this time, defectors from the Soviet side coming to the West) brought information that pointed at Philby and at other agents within the Western governments passing information to the KGB.

One of the most remarkable was a man known as Michael Goleniewski. In April of 1958, he contacted the CIA, and began to send intelligence materials that seemed to be of excellent quality and value. He defected in 1960, and continued to give the Americans what seemed like important information. Among the operations that he "burned" -- identified and helped to bring down -- were Gordon Lonsdale, Russian spy, and George Blake, a senior MI-6 officer involved with the Berlin project. He also was central in tracking down Heinz Felfe in West German intelligence, who was working for the Soviets.

After settling down in the United States, Goleniewski surprised not a few people by revealing (or claiming) that he was really not merely a Goleniewski, but rather a Romanov: he was the son of the last czar, Nicholas II, of Russia, not slain by the Bolsheviks in 1918, but (according to Goleniewski) secretly smuggled out of Russia, and brought eventually to Poland. This story cannot be told here in the detail that it merits; the reader may see Summers and Mangold (1974?), and many other works cited there, for more details.

Not long after Goleniewski defected to the United States, a Soviet KGB officer named Anatoly Golitsin defected. He defected in Helsinki in December 1961, and once in the United States, he proposed the *Sasha theory* (as we might call it): he claimed that there was a highly placed mole in the CIA -- in the Soviet Division of the CIA -- whose operative name was Sasha. Sasha was the source of many highly confidential documents that would reach the KGB, Golitsin claimed, in a matter of days, and Golitsin's ability to separate genuine CIA documents from fakes came as a shock to his interrogators at the CIA: of course he could tell the difference, Golitsin said -- the real ones he had already seen back at the KGB headquarters.

James Angleton, a powerful man within the CIA, found Golitsin's story compelling and convincing, and he began a long and devastating search for Sasha within the CIA. In the end, Angleton did not find Sasha, and in the end, the mature judgment of many was that the damage that Angleton caused in his monomaniacal search for a mole within the Agency surpassed whatever damage the mole (if he existed) could have accomplished without Angleton.

Golitsin had many interesting things to say. He argued, for example, that Kovshuk, the head of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate, had visited the United States in 1957, and that this was for one reason only: to confer with Sasha. No other reason would be big enough, simply put, to justify risking sending such a high ranking KGB officer into enemy territory. We will return to that claim in just a moment.

Among Golitsin's other claims were that the Sino-Soviet split was a Communist deception, and that an infiltration of the French government at a high level, by a group that he called Sapphire, a story that gave rise to the Leon Uris novel *Topaz*. Jacques Foccart, one of de Gaulle's very closest associates and the man who was rumored to control francophone Africa, was accused of being the French Philby, on Golitsin's account. Angleton, who believed a good deal of what Golitsin said, at one point became convinced that David Murphy, then head of the Soviet Division, was Golitsin's Sasha, and Murphy was transmuted to the position of CIA chief of station in Paris. Angleton, though, convinced that Murphy was Sasha (so to speak), eventually told the French president that the CIA Chief of Station was a KGB agent. This was in 1974, I

think, when Pompidou was president, and was one of the causes of Angleton's eventual dismissal at the end of 1974.

Angleton eventually came to believe that Goleniewski was a disinformation agent.¹⁵

More generally, Golitsin was the bearer of a rather larger and more apocalyptic piece of news regarding the global Red menace. He preached that the rift between the Chinese and the Russians was only a cover story. And he warned that he would undoubtedly be followed by other defectors -- fake defectors, this time; defectors who the KGB would unleash just to render his story less palatable to the Western intelligence services. Beware the next defectors you get, Golitsin warned. And it did not take long for the next defector to arrive.

Yuri Nosenko. Yuri Nosenko first contacted the CIA in June of 1962, [just days after Oswald and his wife left the Soviet Union -- Oswald left June 1? Nosenko June 3?] in Geneva, where he was attending an arms reduction meeting. His first controller was Tennant "Pete" Bagley, assisted (since Bagley knew little Russian) by George Kisvalter¹⁶ When asked about Kovshuk's visit to the U.S. (recall that Golitsin had said that Kovshuk had come to meet with his high-placed mole code-named Sasha), Nosenko said the visit was to contact someone whose code name was Andrey, a low-level source, an American serviceman who had worked in the Moscow embassy, and then later returned to the U.S. The Americans found that implausible; why would Kovshuk risk coming to the United States to meet Andrey?¹⁷

But from the start, Nosenko provided extremely interesting information. He said that a Soviet journalist named Boris Belitsky, who the CIA thought was working for them, had been turned by the KGB, and was thus providing doctored information. However, he said that it was in 1961 that this arrangement had been established; the CIA, however, had been working with Belitsky (codenamed AEWIRELESS) since 1958 -- he had been recruited at the Brussel's World's Fair -- and it was thus possible that he had been genuine during his first three years as an informant. In addition, Nosenko revealed that the KGB had uncovered a secret meeting place in Moscow by following a "handsome Armenian" working in the American Embassy -- his name was Abidian. George Kisvalter understood the significance of this: the "dead drop" was of great importance, because it had been set up as an emergency meeting place for Igor Penkovsky, the CIA's most important source in Moscow.

Bagley's initial elation was dampened when James Angleton persuaded him that all of Nosenko's initial revelations were either old news, or else expendable items that the KGB was giving away to establish Nosenko's bona fides.

On January 22, 1964, he reappeared in Geneva, and this time insisted that he had to come over to the United States. Pete Bagley and George Kisvalter flew over from Washington to deal with him. On February 4, he said that he had been ordered to come home, though he later admitted

¹⁵ Ranelagh, p. 567.

¹⁶ Wise, *Molehunt*, 65f. Kisvalter was born in St. Petersburg of a French mother and a Russian father; the family moved to the United States after the outbreak of World War I, and George grew up in New York as an American citizen. Kisvalter served in G-2 intelligence in the Army during WWII, and worked with Reinhard Gehlen for two years after the war, debriefing him.

¹⁷ Wise, *Molehunt*, 70.

that this was a fabrication intended to strengthen his hand. Nosenko also said that he had direct information about the Oswald file.

Initial reaction to Nosenko's defection was positive, but opinion shifted when James Angleton began to build the case that Nosenko was a false defector: that Nosenko was the first of the false defectors that Golitsin had predicted would follow him in order to neutralize the information that Golitsin had provided.

On April 4, 1964, Nosenko was placed in a hostile, prison-like environment, in solitary confinement. During that time, he was "given little food, allowed to shower only once a week, and not allowed a toothbrush or toothpaste". [Posner 40] He had no chance to read, write, listen to radio or TV, or talk to anyone, except during hostile interrogations. On August 13, 1965, he was moved to a new top-secret facility at Camp Perry, where he was locked inside a ten by ten concrete bunker with no windows, and here he had no pillow, sheet, or blanket. "Documents reveal that while the government spent \$1.5 million to construct and man the prison, it spent less than a dollar a day feeding him."¹⁸ A number of Soviet defectors afterward testified to his legitimacy as a defector, including: Yuriy Loginov (1961), Igor Kochnov (1966), Oleg Lyalin (1971), Rudolf Herrmann (1980), Ilya Dzhirkvelov (1980); Vladimir Kuzichkin (1984); Victor Gundarev (1985); Vitaliy Yurchenko (1985); Ivan Bogattyy (1985), and Oleg Gordievskiy (1985).¹⁹

He was not released until xxxxxx, following a decision by Richard Helms on August 23, 1966, that those in charge would have to reach a decision concerning Nosenko's status in 60 days.²⁰ In the fall of 1967 he was transferred to a Washington safe house, and then to a farmhouse.

The Soviet Russia Division developed a report some 447 pages in length which developed a lengthy critique of virtually all of the information Nosenko provided,²¹ while Bruce Solie, in the Office of Security, in a separate report released in October 1968, some 730 pages in length, argue that Nosenko's interrogation had been inconclusive.²²

Rolfe Kingsley became head of the Soviet Division in early 1968, and he conducted a complete review of the Nosenko files.

In October 1968, Bruce Solie submitted a final 283 page report, apparently accepting Nosenko as genuine.²³ He was gradually returned to civil freedom, and in March 1969, he became a consultant to the CIA on the KGB, and he received an annual salary for this of \$16,500; the next month he was released.

To this day, opinion is divided over Nosenko's *bona fides*. Colonel Oleg Nechiporenko, a retired KGB officer with whom Oswald conferred in Mexico City in September, 1963, has recently published his perspective on Nosenko (and Oswald), an essay entitled *Passport to Assassiantion*; Nechiporenko sees Nosenko as an honest defector, not an agent with a KGB story to recount. Gerald Posner, another recent contributor to the Kennedy assassination literature, agrees with

¹⁸ Posner 40

¹⁹ Posner 41.

²⁰ Blakey/Billings 144

²¹ Blakey/Billing 136

²² *ibid.*

²³ Posner 43, Wise 155-56.

him on this; Posner was himself assisted by the CIA in obtaining personal interviews with Nosenko which provided him with material that Posner integrated into his 1993 book, *Case Closed*.

113.6 William Harvey and executive action: in Katanga, in Cuba;

The CIA was close to the plotters involved in several significant assassinations:

- those of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic
- of Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam
- General Rene Schneider in Chile, as well as
- Patrice Lumumba in the Congo -- The Lumumba action moved forward with poisons developed by Dr. Sydney Gottlieb, the chief of the Chemical Division of the Technical Services Staff. In August of 1960, the toxins were forwarded to the COS in Leopoldville, Lawrence Devlin. But Lumumba escaped from UN custody, was captured by forces loyal to Mobutu, and was killed (January 17, 1961) before the CIA team could accomplish the task.
- Other foreign leaders considered for assassination in 1960:
 - Col. Abdul Karrem in Iraq;
 - Rafael Trujillo;
 - Fidel Castro.Karrem and Trujillo were killed in domestic assassination plot, but not before Sydney Gottlieb had posted to Col. Karrem a handkerchief doused in a toxic poison.²⁴

There was an investigation into this in 1975 by a Senate committee chaired by Frank Church of Idaho; it determined that "American officials encouraged or were privy to coup plots which led to the deaths of Trujillo, Diem and Schneider."²⁵ See Chapter 10 for further discussion

Ray Cline, an important CIA official in the 1960s,

The CIA's becoming engaged in planning assassinations was not a momentary aberration on the part of the handful of men who were involved. In January...Bissell ordered William Harvey a veteran station chief, to set up a "standby capability" for what was called euphemistically "Executive Action," by which was plainly meant a capability for assassination of foreign leaders as a "last resort." Harvey was a colorful figure, a former FBI man who carried a pistol at all times when posted abroad, something unique among the CIA officers. I am sure he believed that it was patriotic, even moral, to kill a foreign ruler when ordered to do so by his superiors for reasons of U.S. security. Many of the romantic so-called "cowboy" types of covert action officers would have accepted this proposition, and in 1960-61 many officials outside the CIA would have subscribed to it as well. In any event, the responsible officers in the CIA, Harvey and Bissell, were convinced at the time that the White House had orally urged the creation of an assassination planning capability as a contingency precaution. The written record does not clearly demonstrate this to be either true or untrue.²⁶

²⁴ Ranelagh, p. 345.

²⁵ Alleged Assassination plots, p. 256, cited in Ranelagh, p. 336

²⁶ Cline, *The CIA*, p. 211, cited in Ranelagh, p. 338.

- 111.1. A subcommittee of the 5412 Committee (Special Group, about which we'll have more to say in the chapter on Cuba) was set up in early 1960 to discuss assassinations, primarily of Fidel Castro.
- 112.2. William King Harvey: FBI counterespionage; fired by Hoover in 1947; involvement in the Berlin station in the 1950s, the Berlin tunnel. Harvey "hated Bobby Kennedy's guts with a purple passion."²⁷ Development by Richard Bissell of *Executive Action* office, run by William Harvey. Bissell informed Kennedy's advisor, McGeorge Bundy, but Bundy testified that he did not pass this information on to Kennedy.²⁸

Tracy Barnes

Harvard Law. Chief of psychological and paramilitary staff for Operations.

Bay of Pigs. Case officer for Robert Morrow.

Set up the Domestic Operations Division.

123.7 U-2 flights

In the pre-Sputnik era of the 1950s, flights over Soviet territory were the most important source of American intelligence regarding the Soviet Union. The primary vehicle employed by the CIA was the U-2 plane, which could fly at 90,000 feet, far above the range of other aircraft and of conventional anti-aircraft weapons.²⁹ It was the child of Richard Bissell, Director of Plans.

One of the CIA's largest bases was situated in Atsugi, Japan, where more than 20 buildings belonged to the Joint Technical Advisory Group, which directed the Agency's Asian activities. Atsugi is located about 35 miles southwest of Tokyo.

The U-2 became a household word only when a U-2 was shot down over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960, just prior to the meeting scheduled for Khrushchev and Eisenhower in Paris which was cancelled because of the flight.

Some concern remains as to whether the flight of the U-2 (by Francis Gary Powers, who emerged from the shootdown alive and in good health) was in fact in accord with, or contrary to, presidential orders. Col. Fletcher Prouty, who was the Pentagon's liaison with the CIA at the time, has averred that it was not: "the U-2 was an illegal flight. The U-2 operators had been told not to launch any overflights before the summit conference."³⁰ Shortly before his death in a

²⁷ David Martin, *The CIA's "Loaded Gun"*, Washington Post, October 10, 1976; William A. Corson, *Armies of Ignorance*, New York: 1977, p. 287-288; both cited in Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, p. 516.

²⁸ *The Fish is Red*, p. 71

²⁹ Until recently, it was widely believed that the U-2 flights were the only flights flown over Soviet territory (see, e.g., Summers' remark in *Conspiracy* 145); recent revelations [*US News and World Report*, March 15, 1993] have shown that a large number of conventional military aircraft flew over Soviet airspace, with the expected concomitant loss of personnel lives.

³⁰ Cited by Russell, p. 203, who gives a *Gallery* article as a source; find this in the Prouty book or the collection.

helicopter accident in 1977, Powers said that he believed the U-2 had been sabotaged on the ground before take-off in Turkey.³¹

133.8 Penkovski

143.9 The Cuban activities

Bay of Pigs.

No. 2: Tracy Barnes...

153.10 National Security oversight of CIA: Special Group of NSC

In the 1950s, the so-called 5412 Special Group, as a unit within the National Security Council (NSC), had oversight over CIA. It began to meet regularly only in 1959.³² After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Special Group was reorganized, with General Maxwell Taylor in charge. Early in his administration, responding to a recommendation of Richard Bissell (DDP),³³ Kennedy established a Special Group (CounterInsurgency)³⁴ to coordinate counterinsurgency operations; Maxwell Taylor led this group as well, which included Robert Kennedy. Robert Kennedy's conception of counterinsurgency, at least in principle, was responding to guerrilla efforts which were themselves generated by perceptions of social inequality and injustice. Counterinsurgency was thus "social reform under pressure," in Kennedy's words.³⁵

163.11 assassinations and cooperation with the Mob

McCone first learned of the cooperation with the Mob on August 16, 1963, when he read in the newspaper that the CIA had been involved with Giancana.

³¹ See Russell, *Man Who Knew Too Much*, p. 754, n. 21, which cites an unpublished manuscript by Matthew Coogan entitled "Thirty Years of Deception".

³² Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 492. Schlesinger notes that in its final report to Eisenhower, the board wrote,

We have been unable to conclude that, on balance, all of the covert action programs undertaken by CIA up to this time have been worth the risk or the great expenditure of manpower, money and other resources involved. In addition, we believe that CIA's concentration on political, psychological and related covert action activities have tended to detract substantially from the execution of its primary intelligence-gathering mission. We suggest, accordingly, that there should be a total reassessment of our covert action policies. [Cited in Schlesinger, p. 492]

³³ According to Schlesinger; Power (The Man who Kept the Secrets, 169) credits the idea to Maxwell Taylor.

³⁴ The original members were: McGeorge Bundy, Robert Kennedy, Allen Dulles (later McCone), Lyman Lemnitzer, Roswell Gilpatrick, Edward R. Murrow, and Alexis U. Johnson. Source: Powers, *The Man who knew too much*, p. 434.

³⁵ Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 498.

173.12 Post-Bay of Pigs

In a series of official memoranda (NSAM 55 and 57), Kennedy shifted the responsibility away from the CIA and to the Department of Defense for major paramilitary operations -- for the next Bay of Pigs, in effect.³⁶

Cubela/ AMLASH: In September 1963, Cubela requested a personal meeting with Robert Kennedy. FitzGerald and Helms decided that FitzGerald should meet with Cubela in Robert Kennedy's name, though the two of them informed neither Robert Kennedy nor John McCone of this.

183.13 Dominican Republic: Trujillo Assassination

May 30, 1961: Assassination of Trujillo.

193.14 Connivance of CIA and Organisation de l'Armee Secrete (OAS)

The reader will recall that there was a troubled domestic political scene in France throughout the decade of the 1950s, extending through the period which is of interest to us in this book. The Fourth Republic, that is, the parliamentary system of government that was established in France after the departure of the German army of occupation in World War II, was an unstable creature, rocked during the 1950s first by the defeat of the French army in Indochine, a defeat that came to a head at Dienbienphu in 1954, and then shortly thereafter in Algeria. Unlike Indochina, which was a French colony, Algeria was a full-fledged part of France, though Algeria was composed primarily of two distinct groups, the Arabs, who had lived in Algeria for over a thousand years and whose primary language was Arabic, and the descendents of French settlers, whose families had lived in Algeria for up to perhaps [two hundred] years and whose primary language was French.

The instability of the Fourth Republic came to a head in May of 1958, with a crisis triggered by the military in Algeria. The result of this was the installation of Charles de Gaulle as the head of a new government, formed under a new constitution, forming what came to be known as the Fifth Republic. The crisis of May 1958 was created by a military that wanted stronger support of their efforts to suppress the Arabic separatist organization, the FLN (Front de Liberation National), and the participants generally expected de Gaulle to support their essentially conservative agenda. De Gaulle, however, failed to live up to their expectations in this respect, and officers who could not live with de Gaulle's program leading toward the independence of Algeria were relieved of their commands.

This situation led to a second critical situation as the military officers, now turned against de Gaulle, formed an underground organization called the O.A.S. (l'Organisation de l'Arme'e Secrete). The O.A.S. is perhaps best remembered now for a series of daring and unsuccessful assassination attempts aimed at de Gaulle in the period 1959-1962. (check first and last date).

At the same time that the O.A.S. had created an underground paramilitary organization, it should be borne in mind that the Gaullists had created a similar counterforce, an organization composed of men with dubious and often criminal backgrounds who would be called upon to use strong arm tactics, including eliminations, in order to support the Gaullist goals. These men were known as *barbouzes*, and the *barbouzes* and the O.A.S. were sworn enemies during this period.

³⁶ Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 493.

John Kennedy's political position was unambiguously in favor of the FLN and Algerian independence, a position made clear in his senatorial days. This put him on the enemies list of the O.A.S.

Jean Rene Souetre was involved in the OAS; he approached the CIA in May 1963, saying that he was the coordinator of external affairs for the OAS.³⁷ A short time later he offered material on Communist penetration of the French government. As we will see in Chapter 7, there is curious documentary evidence that Souetre, or someone using his name, was in Dallas on Nov 22, 1963, and that the U.S. government wished him to leave.

203.15 Vietnam

213.16 Domestic Operations Division; Counterintelligence Staff C

Domestic Operations Division was set up in 1962 by Tracy Barnes. One of its first projects included the anti-Castro effort by Robert Morrow (a contract agent with the CIA) involving the production of counterfeit Cuban money.

The Counterintelligence Staff C included William King Harvey and James Angleton.³⁸ Counterintelligence would be chosen to work on the Kennedy assassination.

223.17 The Mid-Seventies Revelations: Chile; Assassinations, etc.

233.18 Moles again? John Paisley

John Paisley's death in October 1978 raised a host of questions both inside the CIA, no doubt, and among readers and leaders. Fifty-five years old and a former high-ranking CIA official, his body (or so it appeared) was found in the Chesapeake Bay after his boat, the *Brillig*, was found adrift. Paisley, it would be learned over the next few years, had been involved in a large number of significant CIA projects.

Paisley was born on 25 August 1923, in Sand Springs, Oklahoma; at the age of 7, his family moved to Phoenix, Arizona.³⁹ In 1941, he joined the Merchant Marine, and he became interested

³⁷ Russell, *The Man Who Knew Too Much*, p. 557-558. Apparently this was in a memo written by Richard Helms.

³⁸ Scott 1993, p. 66

³⁹ For this and other background information, see *Widows*, by Corson, Trento, and Trento (CTT). CTT take very seriously the notion that Paisley was a Soviet mole in the CIA. Richard Case Nagell, a source that was discussed in the appendix to Chapter 2, also believed that Paisley

in the Soviet Union. He learned some Russian during WWII. Sept '46: U. of Oregon. 1948: works for United Nations, radio facilities. A friend, Jim Curran, introduced him to Maryann McLeavy, who he marries (March 29, 1949). Goes to U of Chicago (3 years MA). Did a lot of Merchant Marining throughout this period. Speculation that Richard Innes, on the faculty, was his CIA contact.

Some sources indicate that Paisley met James Angleton in 1948 while Paisley was working as a radio operator with the United Nations in Palestine, eventually recruiting him to work at the Agency.⁴⁰ After studying at the University of Chicago for a period, studying Soviet affairs and international relations, he joined the CIA in 1953. It is perhaps significant that on his application he indicated that he had never traveled to the Soviet Union, or other countries in the Soviet bloc, for he had, while in the merchant marine during World War II. He worked for William Tidwell in Electronics Branch, Directorate of Intelligence.

In 1955, Paisley was sent as liaison to NSA. While he was there, he worked on intercepted material from the Berlin tunnel. Two years later, he returned to the Agency, where he worked on U2; on the SR-71 Blackbird; and on spy satellites (KH-11); he also worked on questioning defectors from Eastern bloc countries, learning Russian during this period.

In 1959, Paisley was appointed as the head of the Electronic Equipment Branch, Industrial Division within the CIA's Office of Research and Reports, where he oversaw the analysis and assessment of the electronics industry in the Soviet Union.⁴¹ (The reader will recall that this was the time when Oswald worked at a radio factory in Minsk. "The CIA maintained a large volume of information on the Minsk radio factory in which Oswald had worked. This information was stored in the Office of Research and Reports," according to a report to the House Assassinations Committee; a former CIA employee "who had worked in the Soviet branch of the Foreign Documents Division of the Directorate of Intelligence in 1962, advised the committee that he specifically recalled collecting intelligence regarding the Minsk radio plant."⁴²)

date? Office of Strategic Research. Paisley's bosses: Bruce Clarke and Edward Proctor. Continues through 1973, perhaps later. Paisley was Number 2.

1964? Involved with the Nosenko interrogations as a member of the Soviet Bloc division.

was a Soviet agent: he was, in the terms of the trade, *nash*: Russian for "ours".

⁴⁰ *Intelligences Secretes* proposes that, with no documentation. Tad Szulc, in "The Missing CIA Man," *Times Magazine*, January 7, 1979 (cited in Russell, *The Man Who Knew Too Much*, p. 209, says that Angleton met Paisley while Paisley was part of UN peace keeping team, and Angleton was looking to pick up people in 1948. {See also card on Angleton picking Paisley for work on plumbers team.} However, Robin Winks, in *Cloak and Gown*, fn. ?, cites Angleton as denying ever having met Paisley. The point is certainly of considerable interest and even importance for the question of Angleton's relationship to a possible Soviet mole in the CIA.

Angleton later told journalist Dick Russell that he did not believe that Paisley had been a security risk, and that Paisley "never had any relations with the covert side" (Russell, 215).

⁴¹ Russell, *The Man Who Knew Too Much*, p. 208.

⁴² Russell, p. 208, who cites *HSCA Final Report* p. 264.

?1969? "Paisley given supervisory control of clearing 'feed' intelligence for a highly classified counterintelligence project called KITTY HAWK." Link to John Funkhouser is OSR of CIA, liaison to FBI.

1970 takes a year in London at the Imperial Defence College.

1971 January. Return to Washington. Help for Kissinger, preparing for SALT 1. Paisley's position was that the Soviets' missiles were extremely inaccurate, and that the USSR could not financially support a continued extensive military build-up.

1971? According to *Intelligences Secretes*, Paisley was approached by the KGB at the beginning of the SALT talks, and asked by them to spy for KGB. Some say that he served as a triple agent in that capacity for up to 20 years. Or perhaps a triple for the Soviet Union?

1971 linked to, member of, Plumbers team in White House. Chosen by Angleton, who makes the suggestion to Helms.

August 9 1971: David Young requests Paisley to look into press leaks. Working on Ellsberg case (codenamed ODESSA).

1972: Sexual connection. Enters the swinging DC scene. Introduced by Donald Burton.

1974. Quits CIA. Joins Coopers and Lybrand, NY accounting firm (privately owned, one of the largest privately owned companies in US, close to CIA, was accountant for Air America).

Date? Becomes friends with Nosenko after 1967. Fluent in Russian, he was an important participant in the decision to clear Nosenko, according to Paisley's wife.⁴³

Links to Nugan Hand??

Paisley was actively involved in an internal dispute in American defense strategy circles regarding the analysis of Soviet capabilities. This dispute led to the establishment of two "teams" -- the "A team" and the "B team" -- whose assignment was to assess Soviet strategic capabilities. The A team consisted of intelligence community officers (including those from the CIA), while the B team was comprised of civilians. Paisley worked with the B team, and served as liaison to the A team, charged with providing the B team with necessary classified documents.⁴⁴

{ Paisley joins the B Team to analyze Soviet capabilities: nuclear and strategic -- in competition, in effect, with the CIA's A Team. Paisley was also the liaison between the two teams. }

1978 September: headlines about the Nosenko kidnapping in the 1960s. Period of Congressional investigation into the treatment of Nosenko.

On September 24, Paisley disappeared. The next day, a ranger at Point Lookout State Park in Md? went aboard what seemed to be an abandoned boat, and he found stacks of papers, including one with the name and address of John Paisley. He called the Coast Guard, and they in

⁴³ Russell, *The Man Who Knew Too Much*, p. 213.

⁴⁴ Russell, 755.

turn brought CIA agents and a lieutenant colonel, who carried away the classified papers.⁴⁵

His disappearance leads to Carter's failure to get the SALT talk accord passed by the Senate.

1980 april: murder of his colleague Ralph Madden (see).

june: murder of Irene Yaskovitch, close collaborator of Paisley's. She translated sensitive Russian documents for him.

24"Recycling" problem

- 1. Bay of Pigs veterans. "Operation Eagle, a 1970 federal roundup of 150 suspects and considered to be the largest in the history of governmental law enforcement, discovered that an incredible 70 percent had been part of hte CIA's Bay of Pigs invasion force."⁴⁶

25FBI

William Sullivan was the head of the Domestic Intelligence Division (Division 5), and it was this Division (and its Soviet section, in particular) that was put in charge of the Oswald investigation after the assassination.⁴⁷

26CIA and the assassination

Excerpts given by Mark Lane from a CIA report about assassination coverage.

Doubtless polls abroad would show similar, or possibly more adverse, results [disbelief in the Warren Commission results]...[this] trend of opinion is a matter of concern [to] our organization....Just because of the standing of the commissioners, efforts to impugn their rectitude and wisdom tend to cast doubt on the whole leadership of American society. ...The aim of this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discredtiing the claims of the conspiracy theoriests, so as to inhibit the circulation of such claims in other countries. Background information is supplied in a classified section and in a number of unclassified attachments....

Point out also that parts of the conspiracy talk appear to be deliberately generated by Communist propagandists. Urge them to use their influence to discourage unfounded and irresponsible speculation....

Employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics. Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for this purpose. The unclassified attachments to this guidance should provide useful background material for passage to assets. Our play should point out, as applicable, that the critics are (i) wedded to theories adopted before the evidence was in, (ii) politically interested, (iii) financially interested; (iv) hasty and inaccurate in their research, or (v) infatuated with their own theories. In the course of discussions of the whole phenomenon of criticism,

⁴⁵ Russell, 214.

⁴⁶ Russell, p. 518

⁴⁷ HSCA 243f, cited in Scott 1993, 62.

a useful strategy may be to single out Epstein's theory for attack, using the attached Fletcher Knebel article and *Spectator* piece for background.⁴⁸

27 JFK's early feeling about the CIA: positive

Speed was certainly one of the skills Kennedy appreciated. He like shortcuts. Before long, McGeorge Bundy reported to Amory that the President had said, "By gosh, I don't care what it is, but if I need some material fast or an idea fast, CIA is the place I hafve to go. The STate Department takes four or five days to answer a simple yes or no."⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Lane, *Plausible Denial*, 71f.

⁴⁹ Ranelagh, p. 353.